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Civil Procedure
Civil Procedure; appointment of conservator for a person of unsound mind
Civil Code § 39 (amended); Probate Code §§ 810, 811, 812, 813, 814,
1881 (new); §§ 1801, 3201, 3204, 3208 (amended).
SB 730 (Mello); 1995 STAT. Ch. 842
Existing law provides that a contract with a person of unsound mind, but who
has capacity of understanding, is subject to rescission even before a court
determines the incapacity of the person.' Chapter 842 declares the Legislature's
intent that a person can have a mental or physical disorder and still have the
capability of performing certain actions? Furthermore, Chapter 842 authorizes
that a rebuttable presumption relating to the burden of proof regarding a person's
mental state will exist if the person cannot manage his or her own financial
resources.
3
Additionally, Chapter 842 further adds that a person is not competent to make
a decision unless that person can communicate and appreciate that decision.
1. CAL. Cv. CODE § 39(a) (amended by Chapter 842); see e.g., Mills v. Kopf, 216 Cal. App. 2d 780,
782, 31 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1963) (holding that where a contract is made by one who is of unsound mind, but
is not without complete understanding, one cannot rescind unless the party rescinding restores any
consideration received); Weseman v. Latham, 153 Cal. App. 2d 841, 846, 315 P.2d 364, 367 (1957)
(commenting that where a contract is rescinded because of the incompetency of one of the parties, it is
necessary that the other party be restored with the consideration that was exchanged during the transaction);
Knighten v. Davis, 358 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala.1978) (stating that where an incompetent is able to cancel a
contract, the other party is restored to the same position which he occupied prior to the transaction); Bryant
v. Bryant, 379 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that a grantor, who lacked capacity to
execute a deed, also lacked capacity to change his bank account); McCraw v. Watkins, 249 S.E.2d 202, 203
(Ga.1978) (holding that the defense of mental incapacity to avoid a contract is not conditional upon the offer
to return consideration of contract to plaintiff); Cohen v. Crumpacker, 586 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Mo. Ct.
App.1979) (commenting that avoidance of a contract through intervention of equitable relief because one is
mentally incompetent normally requires inequitable incidents to have occurred); Pemberton v. Reed, 545
S.W.2d 698, 700 (Mo. CL App. 1976) (holding that while the grantor lived, prospective heirs of the grantor
could not challenge a conveyance the grantor made while she was mentally incompetent); Freshour v. Aumak,
567 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (allowing a contract with an insane person by one having
knowledge of his incapacity to be set aside as void); Estate of Lucas v. Whiteley, 550 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (stating that where a person was mentally incompetent when he executed the power of
attorney, the power of attorney is voidable at the election of the incompetent).
2. CAL. PROD. CODE § 810(a) (enacted by Chapter 842); see id. (finding that a person may enter into
contracts, convey, marry, execute wills, and make medical decisions even with a mental or physical disorder);
see also United States v. Manny, 645 F.2d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a comatose person is mentally
incompetent while his coma continues).
3. CAL CIv. CODE § 39(b) (amended by Chapter 842); see id. (stating that a substantial inability to
manage a person's financial resources is to be shown by more than mere isolated incidents of negligence or
improvidence in order to rescind a contract based on incapacity).
4. CAL PROD. CODE § 811 (enacted by Chapter 842); see id (declaring that a person lacks the capacity
to make a decision unless the person can appreciate the following: (1) the responsibilities created by the
decision, (2) the consequences for the decision maker, and (3) the significant risks involved in the decision);
see also Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 824, 832, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521,527 (1968) (holding that the test of
mental competency to determine whether a party is entitled to rescission of a contract is directed at cognitive
capacity); Drum v. Bummer, 77 Cal. App. 2d 453, 460, 175 P.2d 879, 883 (1947) (stating that the test to
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Chapter 842 determines that a person can be classified as incompetent to do a
certain act if supported by evidence demonstrating a mental deficit.5
Existing law provides that a conservator 6 may be appointed for a person who
is unable to provide for his or her own personal needs.7 Chapter 842 augments
existing law by requiring that a conservator can be appointed only upon a
showing of clear and convincing evidence! Chapter 842 also adds that a
conservatee cannot consent to medical treatment if the conservatee does not,
through a rational thought process, know and appreciate the treatment?
COMMENT
Chapter 842 was enacted because of the lack of a clear statutory standard by
which a court could determine if someone had the capacity to perform certain
acts.' ° Additionally, Chapter 842 is intended to allow individuals who fall into a
determine if a person was mentally incompetent at time of execution of contract is whether the person fully
understood the nature and purpose of the contract); Pomeroy v. Collins, 198 Cal. 46, 57, 243 P. 657, 661
(1926) (commenting that a party executing a trust deed may lack sufficient capacity to judge the effect on his
own property); Carr v. Sacramento Clay Products Co., 35 Cal. App. 439, 444-45, 170 P. 446, 450 (1917)
(noting that in order to rescind a contract, the party must be mentally incompetent to deal with the subject
before him without a full understanding of his rights).
5. CAL. PROB. CODE § 812(a) (enacted by Chapter 842); see id. (declaring that a determination of
incapacity of a person must be supported by demonstrating a deficit in at least one of the following mental
functions: (1) alertness and attention, (2) information processing, (3) thought processes, and (4) ability to
modulate mood); see also In re Daniels, 140 Cal. 335, 337, 73 P. 1053, 1054 (1903) (holding that the required
state of incompetency which is necessary to be demonstrated to appoint a conservator will be controlled by the
statutory language); W. J. Dunn, Annotation, Mental Condition Which Will Justify the Appointment oJ
Guardian, Committee, or Conservator of the Estate for an Incompetent or Spendthrift, 9 A.L.R. 3D 774, 778
(1994) (stating that the mere lack of good business sense does not amount to the sufficient degree of
incompetency necessary to justify the appointment of a conservator). But see In re Hoffman's Estate, 58 A.
665, 666 (Pa. 1904) (cautioning that courts must exercise conservatism when appointing a conservator because
incompetents are vulnerable to being abused); In re Wingert 63 A.2d 441,442 (Pa. Super. Ct.1949) (holding
that the appointment of a conservator was appropriate, even though the person was mentally alert, because the
evidence demonstrated that she was being victimized by others).
6. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 306 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "conservator" as a person appointed
by a court to manage the estate of one who is unable to manage property and business affairs effectively).
7. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(a), (b) (amended by Chapter 842); see id. (authorizing a conservator to
be appointed when a person cannot provide for the physical health, food, shelter, clothing, or financial
resources for oneself); cf. ALA. CODE § 26-2A-100 (1994) (allowing the parent of an unmarried incapacitated
person the authority to appoint a guardian or conservator); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575a (West Supp.
1995) (providing that any person over 18 years of age can appoint a conservator for oneself for future
incapacity); MAss. Gi. LAws ANN. ch. 201, § 6A (West 1994) (providing if, after notice of a hearing, the
court determines that a person is mentally retarded to the extent that he or she poses an unreasonable risk to
his or her health, the court may appoint a guardian for that person).
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (e) (amended by Chapter 842). But cf. Keiser v. Keiser, 204 N.W. 394,
396 (Neb. 1925) (stating that no firm guideline can be established which will be a safe criterion in every case).
9. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1881(a) (enacted by Chapter 842); see id. § 3208(a) (amended by Chapter 842)
(authorizing the court to recommend medical treatment or appoint a conservator on behalf of a person if the
medical treatment is required and there is a probability that the condition can become life-threatening or pose
a serious threat); cf. 60 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 375, 377 (1977) (stating that conservators who feel compelled to
make necessary medical decisions for adult conservatees should obtain express judicial authority to do so).
10. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrmEE ANALYSIS OFSB 730, at 6 (May 25, 1995).
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particular diagnostic classification to make decisions regarding certain acts if they
are still mentally competent."1 However, Chapter 842 is not intended to increase
or decrease the number of cases in which a court must determine the capacity of
an individual.
1 2
Proponents argue that Chapter 842 provides courts an objective and rational




Civil Procedure; certificate of merit for professional negligence actions
Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35 (amended).
SB 934 (Campbell); 1995 STAT. Ch. 241
Under existing law, in specific actions' for indemnity or damages arising out
of the professional negligence of a person licensed as a professional architect,
2
engineer,3 or land surveyor,4 the plaintiff's attorney is required to file a certificate
of merit for obtaining consultation with at least one professional architect,
11. SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMTrEE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 730, at 7 (May 16, 1995); see id.
(observing that the mere fact that a patient is diagnosed with a certain mental disease does not automatically
mean that the patient is incompetent); Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law of
Conservatorship in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 273, 276 (stating that the theory of conservatorship law
cautions that only individuals that absolutely need a conservator should have one appointed); id. at 277
(commenting that it is possible for a person to have a conservator appointed for oneself, yet still retain control
over salary, wages, and allowances because these rights and powers are within the discretion of the court to
control).
12. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 730, at 2 (May 25, 1995); SENATE JUDICIARY
CoMMrrrEE, COMMIrrEE ANALYSTS OF SB 730, at 2 (May 16, 1995).
13. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrTm, CoMMrrlEE ANALYSIS OF SB 730, at 8 (May 16, 1995); see id.
(referring to § 813 in the California Probate Code); id. at 8 (noting that § 813 was developed by professors in
geropsychiatry and neurology, and was circulated widely among various committees for approval).
1. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 411.35(i) (amended by Chapter 241) (stating that "action" includes
a complaint or cross-complaint for equitable indemnity arising out of the rendering of professional services
whether or not the complaint or cross-complaint specifically asserts or utilizes the terms "professional
negligence" or "negligence").
2. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5500.1(a) (West 1990) (defining the "practice of architecture" as
offering or performing, and being responsible for, professional services which require the skills of an architect
in the planning of sites, and the design, in whole or in part, of buildings or groups of buildings and structures).
3. See id. § 6701 (West 1995) (defining "professional engineer" as a person who renders service or
creative work, which requires education, training, and experience in engineering sciences and the application
of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences); see also id. § 6702 (West 1995)
(defining "civil engineer"); id. § 6702.1 (West 1995) (defining "electrical engineer"); id. § 6702.2 (West 1995)
(defining "mechanical engineer").
4. See id. § 8701 (West 1995) (defining "professional land surveyor" as "one who offers or is engaged
in the practice of land surveying").
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engineer, or land surveyor who is not a party to the action.5 The certificate of
merit must declare that the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, has
obtained a consultation, and has concluded, based upon this information, that
there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing the action.6 Existing law also
provides that if the attorney cannot obtain such a consultation, then he or she must
file a certificate declaring the reason that the consultation cannot be obtained?
5. CAL. Ctv, PROC. CODE § 411.35(a) (amended by Chapter 241); see id. (requiring the plaintiff's
attorney to file the certificate of merit on or before the date of service of the complaint on any defendant); Id.
§ 411.35(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 241) (requiring the certificate of merit to declare that the attorney has
reviewed the facts of the case and that the attorney has consulted with at least one architect, professional
engineer, or land surveyor who is licensed to practice and practices in this state or any other state, or who
teaches at an accredited college and is licensed to practice in this or any other state, in the same discipline as
the defendant or cross-defendant, and who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the relevant
issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney has concluded on the basis of such review and
consultation that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing the action); id. § 411.35(c) (amended
by Chapter 241) (mandating that where a certificate is required pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 411.35, only one certificate shall be filed, notwithstanding that multiple defendants have been named in the
complaint or may be named at a later time); id. § 411.35(d) (amended by Chapter 241) (stating that where the
attorney intends to rely solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or exclusively on a failure to inform of the
consequences of procedure, or both, the certificate of merit does not apply); id. § 411.35(e) (amended by
Chapter 241) (providing that an attorney who submits a certificate of merit has a privilege to refuse to disclose
the identity of the architect, professional engineer, or land surveyor consulted as well as the contents of the
consultation, and that this privilege is also held by the person consulted); id. (mandating further that if the
attorney makes a claim that he or she was unable to obtain the required consultation pursuant to California
Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35(bX3), the court may require the attorney to divulge the names of architects,
professional engineers, or land surveyors refusing the consultation); id. § 411.35(f) (amended by Chapter 241)
(stating that a violation of the certificate of merit provision may constitute unprofessional conduct and be
grounds for discipline against the attorney, except that the failure to file the certificate required by California
Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35(b)(1), within 60 days after filing the complaint and certificate provided for
by California Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35(bX2), shall not be grounds for discipline against the attorney);
id. § 411.35(g) (amended by Chapter 241) (providing that the failure to file a certificate of merit shall be
grounds for a demurrer pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant
to § 435); see also Korbel v. Chou, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1430-31, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190, 191-92 (1994)
(holding that a settlement is not the same as a favorable termination since it reflects ambiguously on the merits
of the action and leaves open the question of a defendant's guilt or innocence; thus, pursuant to California
Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35, the attorney for the plaintiff does not have to reveal the information he
obtained from the consultant used to establish the certificate of merit); cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-602(1)
(Supp. 1995) (requiring that in an action for damages or indemnity based upon a licensed professional's alleged
professional negligence the complaining party's attorney must file with the court a certificate of review, for
each named licensed professional, within 60 days after the service of the complaint, unless the court determines
that a longer period is necessary for good cause shown); Martinez v. Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 248 (Colo. 1992)
(citing Colorado law which provides that the failure to file a certificate of merit shall result in the dismissal of
the complaint, counterclaim, or cross claim); id. at 249 (maintaining that the certificate of review is rcquircd
only with respect to those claims of professional negligence which require the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case by means of expert testimony). See generally CAL. EviD. CODE § 646(b) (West 1995) (stating that
the judicial doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a presumption which affects the burden of putting forth evidence);
id. § 646(c) (West 1995) (declaring that, if the facts support a res ipsa loquitur presumption and the defendant
has introduced evidence to support a finding that he was not negligent or not a proximate cause of the
occurrence, the court may instruct the jury in a specified manner).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 411.35(a) (amended by Chapter 241).
7. Id. § 411.35(b)(2), (3) (amended by Chapter 241); see id. (requiring the plaintiff's attorney to file
a certificate declaring why the attorney was not able to obtain a consultation, for either of two reasons: (1) A
statute of limitations would impair the action and the certificate could not he obtained before the impairment
of the action; or (2) the attorney has made three separate good faith attempts with three separate architects,
professional engineers, or land surveyors to obtain this consultation, and none of those contacted would agree
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 27
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Chapter 241 requires an attorney who obtains a consultation to also obtain an
opinion from the person consulted as to whether or not the named defendant or
cross-defendant was negligent in the performance of the applicable professional
services.'
Prior law provided for the repeal of California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 411.35 on January 1, 1997.9 Chapter 241 deletes the repeal provision. °
COMMENT
The purpose of the certificate of merit is to provide architects, engineers, and
land surveyors protection from frivolous professional negligence suits." Chapter
241 strengthens this provision by requiring an opinion from the person consulted
as to whether the professional was negligent in the performance of the
professional services.' 2 This requirement is in addition to the consultation that is
required under existing law. 3 Opponents argued that Chapter 241 would serve
only to increase the complexity and cost of litigation; therefore, in the final
version of Chapter 241, the author deleted certain provisions such as the
to the consultation).
8. Id. § 411.35(b)(I) (amended by Chapter 241).
9. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 272, sec. 1, at 1479 (amending CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 411.35).
10. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 411.35(h) (amended by Chapter 241).
11. Guinn v. Dotson, 23 Cal. App. 4th 262, 270, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409, 414 (1994); see SENATE FLOOR,
CoMMrrrEE AiiALYsis OF SB 934, at 2 (May 18, 1995) (stating that a 1987 study commissioned by the
California Council of Civil Engineers and Land Surveyors suggests that the certificate of merit has successfully
weeded out frivolous litigation since fewer malpractice suits are filed against design professionals and more
malpractice suits are dismissed); id. (maintaining that to improve the law's effectiveness in protecting against
frivolous malpractice actions, the Legislature enacted SB 1718 in 1988 to provide an in-camera proceeding of
the consultant's name and address for a post-trial court review of the certificate of merit consultation when the
plaintiff's lawsuit is unsuccessful); 3 B.E. WTKN, CALIFORNIA PROcEDuR, Actions § 156(a) (9th ed. Supp.
1995) (noting that the certificate of merit required for malpractice actions against physicians, dentists,
podiatrists, and chiropractors attempts to eliminate frivolous malpractice actions against those persons); see
also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 411.35(h) (amended by Chapter 241) (mandating that upon the favorable
conclusion of the litigation with respect to any party for whom a certificate of merit was filed, or for whom a
certificate of merit should have been filed, the trial court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the court's
own motion, verify compliance with California Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35, by requiring the attorney
for the plaintiff or cross-complainant to disclose the name, address, and telephone number of persons consulted
and relied upon to the trial judge); id. (providing for an in-camera proceeding at which the moving party will
not be present in order to satisfy the certificate of merit requirement in California Code of Civil Procedure §
411.35(b)); id. (mandating that if the trial judge finds that there has been a failure to comply with California
Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35, the court may order a party, a party's attorney, or both, to pay any
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of the failure to comply
with this section).
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 411.35(b)(I) (amended by Chapter 241); see ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY
COMmrFTEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 934, at 3 (July 5, 1995) (asserting that the law prior to Senate Bill
934 permitted a certificate of merit to be based upon casual consultation, commonly referred to as "cocktail
consultation," where a plaintiff's attorney casually asked whether a proposed action "had any merit").
13. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 411.36(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 241).
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requirement that the consultant file a written report and review relevant
documents before rendering his or her opinion.14
Tyson Shower
Civil Procedure; civil discovery
Code of Civil Procedure § 1985.6 (new).
AB 617 (Kuehl); 1995 STAT. Ch. 299
Existing law provides that a person who, by subpoena duces tecum,' seeks the
production of a consumer's personal records2 held by a witness, must notify the
consume? by delivering a copy of the subpoena, the affidavit supporting the
issuance of the subpoena, and a specified notice to the consumer.4
14. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrEE, COMM=TTEE ANALYSIS of SB 934, at 4 (May 9, 1995)
(suggesting that requiring the consultant to submit a written report and to review all relevant documents before
issuing his or her written report would be an undue and unnecessary burden for plaintiffs and that the cost of
a written report would range from a few hundred to several thousand dollars); Compare SB 934, available in
LEXIS, Cal Library; Cabill File, Version-Date Feb. 23, 1995 (proposing to amend CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
411.35(b)(1) with 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 241, sec. 1, at 700.
1. See CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1987.5 (West Supp. 1995) (describing "subpoena duces tecum" as
requiring the appearance and the production of matters and things at a deposition).
2. See id. § 1985.3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "personal records" as any copy of a book,
document, or other writing relating to a consumer and maintained by any witness, which includes, but not
limited to, a hospital, a bank, an insurance company, attorney, accountant, or a school).
3. See id. § 1985.3(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "consumer" as any individual, partnership of
five or fewer persons, association, or trust which has conducted business with the witness or has acted as a
fiduciary to the witness).
4. Id. § 1985.3(b) (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 1985.3(e) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring a subpoena
duces tecum to be accompanied with notice indicating that the records of the consumer are being sought, that
the consumer can file papers with the court prior to the production date if the consumer objects to furnishing
the papers, and that the consumer should consult with an attorney in regard to protecting the consumer's
privacy); cf. 18 U.S.C.A. § 986(a) (West Supp. Pamphlet 1995) (providing that, in an in rem proceeding, any
party may request a subpoena duces tecum for a financial institution to produce documents, such as books or
records, and the requestor must provide notice to all parties of the request); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b), (c)
(permitting a party to request the production of documents kept in the usual course of business, and allowing
the production by parties not a party); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:10(I)(a), (b) (1995) (providing that a
request for financial records may be obtained under a subpoena duces tecum if the request is issued to both the
financial institution and the customer, and 10 days after service or 14 days after mailing if the customer does
not move to quash the subpoena); 13 C.F.R. § 134.25(b) (1994) (requiring a request for a subpoena duces
tecum to specify with particularity which books, papers, documents and facts are expected to be provided). See
generally Sehlmeyer v. Department of Gen. Serv., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1080-81, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 844.
45 (1993) (holding that a person's personal records are subject to disclosure in a administrative proceeding if
the subpoenaing party takes reasonable steps to notify the person and affords the person a fair opportunity to
assert his or her interests by objecting to the disclosure); Slagle v. Maryon, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1312, 260
Cal. Rptr. 122, 124 (1989) (concluding that a court does not lack jurisdiction to a motion to quash a subpoena
duces tecum even though the motion is brought after the date set forth in the subpoena); Sasson v. Katash, 146
Cal. App. 3d 119, 124, 126-27, 194 Cal. Rptr. 46,48-49 (1983) (declaring that a subpoenaed lease agreement
comes under the definition of personal record, that the word "maintained" does not mean records prepared but
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 27
Civil Procedure
Chapter 299 enacts similar requirements regarding a person seeking the
production of employment records5 of an employee6 maintained by his or her
current or former employer.7
COMMENT
Under existing law, an individual is notified when personal records are
subpoenaed so that the person may contest the subpoena based on the information
being protected by privacy.8 However, a person's employment record is not
subject to notification, and thus, these records could be turned over, even though
they may contain confidential information. 9 Therefore, according to the sponsor,
the State Bar's Conference of Delegates, Chapter 299 was enacted to cure this
defect in the law.' In addition, the notice requirement of Chapter 299 assists
custodians of records in that they are placed in an uncomfortable situation when
means preserved, and that the subpoenaing party must prove that the records are material to the issues involved
in the case, to the credibility of the witness or hearsay); William A. Fenwick & Gordon K. Davidson,
Admissibility of Computerized Business Records, 14 AM. JuR. 2D Proof of Facts § 173 (1977) (discussing the
admissibility of a business' computer records and the type of evidentiary considerations that need to be
considered).
5. See CAL CIv. PRO. CODE § 1985.6(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 299) (defining "employment records"
as any copy of books, documents, or other writing regarding employment of an employee maintained by a
current or former employer).
6. See id. § 1985.6(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 299) (defining "employee" as a person who is or has
been employed by a witness subject to a subpoena duces tecum).
7. Id. § 1985.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 299); see id. § 1985.6(e) (enacted by Chapter 299) (requiring
a subpoena duces tecum to be accompanied with notice indicating that the records of the employee are being
sought, that the employee can file papers with the court prior to the production date if the employee objects
to furnishing the papers, and that the employee should consult with an attorney in regard to protecting the
employee's privacy); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (finding that the
liberal civil discovery rules provides plaintiffs access to employers' records).
8. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMrrTEE, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 617, at 2-3 (May 10, 1995); see
SENATE RULES CoMmTTEE, CoMMrmrm ANALYsIS OF AB 617, at 2 (July 17, 1995) (noting that the notice
requirement provides the consumer some ability to protect his/her valid privacy rights); see also CAL. CONST.
art. 1, §1 (mandating that all people have inalienable rights which include pursuing and obtaining privacy);
Sasson, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 124, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49 (holding that the purpose of California Code of Civil
Procedure § 1985.3 is to protect the consumer's right to privacy in his or her personal records kept by a bank,
a doctor, etc.). See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Rights and Remedies of Financial Institution
Customer in Relation to Subpoena Duces Tecum Exception to General Prohibitions of State Right to Financial
Privacy, 43 A.L.R. 1157 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing cases and statutes that have decided the issue of
whether a financial institution's customer should be protected under the right to privacy when a civil litigant
utilizes subpoena duces tecum to discover a person's financial statements).
9. ASSEMBLY JUDICtARY COMMTEE, COMMrTEE ANALYStS OF AB 617, at 2 (May 10, 1995); see
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEE, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 617, at 3 (July 11, 1995) (setting forth the State
Bar's Conference of Delegates' (sponsor's) assertion that there is no reason why notification should not be
required when employment records are sought, and that employment records contain very private records with
legitimate privacy rights attached). See generally Lantz v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1839, 1853-54,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 366-67 (1994) (indicating that the discovering party must show there is a compelling need
for discovery and that this compelling need must be so strong as to outweigh the privacy interests).
10. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITIrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS oF AB 617, at 2 (May 10, 1995); see
SENATE RULEs ComMITTEE, CoMMrTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 612, at 2 (July 17, 1995) (noting that the lack of
notification results in an employees legitimate expectation of privacy being ignored).
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the records are requested." Finally, Chapter 299 creates a new code section
because the existing statute is broadly drafted and just inserting the term
"employer" to the list of witnesses would have an unintended effect.'"
Chad D. Bernard
Civil Procedure; dishonored checks-damages
Civil Code § 1719 (amended).
AB 522 (Katz); 1995 STAT. Ch. 134
Under existing law, any person who passes a check on insufficient funds' is
liable to the payee2 for treble damages,3 as well as the face value of the check and
any costs to mail a written demand for payment, in addition to any penal
sanctions that may apply.4 Existing law provides that liability exists only if the
11. SENATE RULES CommnE CommTmEE ANALYSIS OF AB 617, at 2 (July 17, 1995); see id. (noting
that the custodian of records may violate a subpoena and become subject to judicial sanction for failing to
provide the records, but if the custodian does turn over the employee's records, the employer may be subject
to civil suit or penalty for turning over records which should not have been turned over); see also Peter G.
Weinstock, Banking Law Developments 1990, 44 Sw. LJ. 709,736 (1990) (stating that prior to enactment of
a Texas statute that prohibited disclosure by financial institutions, except in limited circumstances, financial
institutions were confronted with conflicting interests of litigants wanting customer records and its customers
wanting to keep their affairs private); id. (indicating that the institution is caught in the middle and can either
protect its customer's privacy interest or provide the information, but subject itself to claims by its customers).
12. ASSEMBLYJUDIciARYCOMMrE COMMITEANALYSISOF AB 617, at 2-3 (May 10, 1995); see
id at 3 (noting that the unintended effect would be requiring notice in all instances that a subpoena is directed
to a business entity).
1. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1719(a)(3)(A)-(C) (amended by Chapter 134) (defining "to pass a check on
insufficient funds" as to make, utter, draw, or deliver any check that is refused because the account used to pay
the check lacks funds or credit, the check maker does not have an account with the drawee, or the drawee was
ordered to stop payment on the check).
2. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1129 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "payee" as the person to whom or
to whose order a bill, note, or check is made payable).
3. See 6 B.E. WrriaN, SUmMARY OFCALIFORN A LAW, Torts § 1333 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995)
(defining treble damages as an award of three times the amount of actual damages); BLACK's LAW DIClnONARY
393 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "treble damages" as damages given by statute in certain cases, consisting of the
damages fcund by thejury, actually tripled in amount); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1995)
(stating that exemplary damages, such as treble damages, are permitted when it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice); Beeman v. Burling, 216
Cal. App. 3d 1586, 1598, 265 Cal. Rptr. 719, 726 (1990) (stating that statutory damages may take the form of
penalties that are composed of arbitrary sums or they may provide for a doubling or tripling of actual damages);
cf. MeMahon Food Co. v. Call, 406 N.E.2d 1206, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the legislature can
provide for punitive damages, such as treble damages, in cases where the defendant is also subject to criminal
penalties without violating double jeopardy principles).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1719(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 134); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 476a(a) (West
Supp. 1995) (criminalizing the passing of worthless checks); see also id. § 648 (West 1988) (criminalizing the
unauthorized issuing or circulating of money). For examples of other statutes providing for treble damages,
see CAL Civ. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1995) (trebling damages for unlawful discrimination under the Unruh
Act); CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE § 732 (West 1980) (trebling damages for waste); id. § 733 (West 1980) (trebling
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individual fails to pay the amount due on the bad check within thirty days of the
mailing of a written demand for payment,5 unless he or she stopped payment to
resolve a good faith dispute with the payee.6 Prior law, however, capped any
possible treble damage awards at $5007
Chapter 134 provides for treble liability if the check writer fails to make cash
payment to the recipient of the check, within thirty days of the demand for
payment, for the amount of the check and any bad check charges levied by the
payee's financial institution.8 Chapter 134 also increases the $500 cap on treble
damages to $1500.9 Additionally, Chapter 134 provides that any amount owing
on a bad check is to be decreased by any partial payment made within thirty days
of the written demand."t The remedies provided by Chapter 134 are mandatorily
imposed upon the court."
COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 134 is to provide a stronger disincentive for bad
damages for trespass to land for the purpose of carrying away or cutting down trees); id. § 735 (West 1980)
(trebling damages for forcible or unlawful entry).
5. See CAL Crv. CODE § 1719(a)(2)(A) (amended by Chapter 134) (stating that the written demand
must be sent by certified mail and must inform the person of the provisions of this section, the amount of the
check, and that he or she has 30 days to respond); see also id. § 1719(c) (amended by Chapter 134) (providing
the form of the notice required when a check issuer subsequently stops payment).
6. Id. § 1719(aX2)(B) (amended by Chapter 134); see id. § 1719(b) (amended by Chapter 134) (stating
that a good faith dispute is determined by the trier of fact and can be established by proving one of the
following: (1) the goods or services purchased were faulty or not as promised; (2) the promised goods were
not delivered; (3) the promised services were not rendered; or (4) there were overcharges); see also Schultz
v. Town of Lakeport, 5 Cal. 2d 377, 382, 54 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1936) (citing a South Carolina case, Poole v.
Paris Mountain Water Co., 62 S.E. 874 (S.C. 1908), which held that one party cannot coerce another into
paying a bill which is unjust or which the other, in good faith, disputes).
7. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 522, sec. 1, at 2269 (enacting CAL. CiV. CODE § 1719); cf. HAW. REV. STAT. §
490:3-506(a) (Supp. 1992) (providing for treble damages not to exceed $500); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30-1(1)
(West Supp. 1994) (providing for treble damages with no maximum).
8. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1719(a)(2)(A) (amended by Chapter 134).
9. Id. § 1719(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 134); see AssEmBLY FLoOR, CoMMrrrEE ANALYsis oFAB
522, at 2 (Apr. 6, 1995) (noting that the prior additional damages maximum of $500 made it economically
unwise for small businesses to pursue any remedy).
10. CAL Civ. CODE § 1719(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 134).
11. Id. § 1719(h) (amended by Chapter 134); see id. § 1719(a)(1), (2) (amended by Chapter 134)
(providing that if the maker fails to honor the check and does not have a good faith dispute, the court must
award the payee: (1) The amount of the check; (2) treble damages of not less than $100 nor more than $1500;
(3) the cost of mailing the notice to pay; and (4) any check or service charge incurred by the payee as a result
of the bad check); see also Mughrabi v. Suzuki, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1212, 1215-16, 243 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440
(1988) (holding that the treble damages provision of California Penal Code § 1719 is mandatory). But see
Kanner v. Globe Bottling Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 559, 568, 78 Cal. Rptr. 25, 31 (1969) (concluding that in an
action under California Code of Civil Procedure § 732, imposing treble damages is not required of the court);
Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 485, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9, 14-15 (1963) (holding that the imposition of
treble damages under California Code of Civil Procedure § 735 is purely within the discretion of the court).
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check writers. 12 Additionally, by providing a higher treble damages cap, the
Legislature intended to deter further increases of burdensome bad check disputes
on small claims court dockets. t3 However, there is some question as to whether
additional damage provisions have any remedial effect on bad check writers.'4
Timothy J. Moroney
Civil Procedure; judges-limits on gifts, honoraria, and travel expenses
Code of Civil Procedure § 170.9 (amended).
SB 353 (Alquist); 1995 STAT. Ch. 378
Existing law provides that no judge' can accept a gife of more than $250
12. ASSaiBLYJUDIciARYCOMMriTEmECOMrmFEEANALYSISOFAB 522, at2 (Mar. 29,1995); see also
L (stating that proponents argued that a higher treble damages maximum would provide businesses with the
economic incentive to seek collection); Traci Gentilozzi, Bad.Check Writers, Shoplifters Could Face Stiffer
Penalties, MIcH. LAws. WiY., Feb. 20, 1995, at 2 (arguing that the prospect of paying double damages after
a trial for bad checks provides incentive for people to honor their checks). But see ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY
COMMrE supra, at 3 (noting that opponents argued that a cap raise based on inflation would increase the
cap to $736, not $1500).
13. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 134, sec. 2, at 443 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 1719); see also Less
Litigation State Lawmakers Consider Tort Reform Bills, SAN DIEO UNIoN-TRIB., Apr. 20, 1995, at I (arguing
that excessive litigation is hurting the state's competitiveness).
14. ASSEMBLYJuDIciARYCoMrrr.ECOMMnr7EEANALYSISOFAB 522, at 3 (Mar. 29, 1995); see id.
(stating that data regarding the number of payees who used the bad check law, prior to Chapter 134's
enactment, as well as the law's deterrent effect, were nonexistent); see also Anne O'Connor, Bad Checks Cost
State Businesses, Citizens More Than $132 Million in '93, STAR TRI., Mar. 4, 1995, at 1B (stating that there
is a system in place that would allow sales clerks to determine whether a checking account has enough money
in it, if it does not, the clerk need not accept the check).
1. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 170.9(c) (amended by Chapter 378) (stating that for the purposes of
California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.9, the term judge encompasses judges of the justice, municipal, or
superior courts, and justices who preside on the California Courts of Appeal or the Supreme Court).
2. See id § 170.9(o (amended by Chapter 378) (defining the term "gift" as meaning any payment that
is given in which consideration of greater or equal value is not received and includes a rebate or discount in
price of anything unless that rebate or discount is normally given in the course of business); id. (stating that
any person, except a defendant in a criminal action, has the burden of proving that the payment received was
not a gift); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82028(a) (West 1993) (defining "gift," in relation to acceptance by
government officials and candidates, as any payment made without consideration of equal or greater value
given and includes rebates and discounts not given in the regular course of business to the general public); CAL.
CODE REOS. tit. 2, § 18941(a) (1995) (relating that a discount or rebate given or received by an official is not
a gift if such is given in the regular course of business); id. § 18941(b) (1995) (declaring that a gift is accepted
or received by a public official when he or she knows he or she has actual possession over the gift or takes any
steps showing control over the gift except as otherwise provided in this section or in California Cede of
Regulations, Title 2 § 18943); id. § 18941(b)(2), (3) (1995) (explaining that the discarding of a gift does not
negate the prior acceptance of a gift by the official and the giving of a gift received to another person is still
considered to be a gift accepted); id. § 18941.1 (1995) (providing, with a few exceptions, that payments made
to an official for his or her food is considered a gift); id. § 18943 (1995) (discussing how a government official
may return, donate, or reimburse the person for a gift); id. § 18945 (1995) (setting forth the guidelines for
determining if a person or organization is considered a source of a gift).
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from a single source3 in any calendar year.4 However, existing law does exempt
certain advances, payments, and reimbursements for travel and related expenses.5
Further, existing law does not prohibit the receipt of certain, specified gifts.6
Existing law also provides that no judge may accept any type of honorarium.7
3. see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18945.1 (1995) (defining the term "single source" as used within
California Government Code §§ 89501, 89504, and 89505).
4. CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 170.9(a) (amended by Chapter 378); see id. § 170.9(d) (amended by
Chapter 378) (stating that the gift limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.9 must be
adjusted biennially by the Commission on Judicial Performance in order to reflect changes in the Consumer
Price Index, which must be rounded to the nearest ten dollars); see also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8(a) (describing
and allowing for the Commission on Judicial Performance, and describing the membership along with term
limits); Sanjour v. EPA, 984 F.2d 434,451 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority
in that it is very important to maintain public confidence in the government and that this confidence can be
disturbed with activities of corruption), reh'g granted, 997 F.2d 1584 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Adams v. Comm'n on
Judicial Performance, 8 Cal. 4th 630, 663, 882 P.2d 358, 379, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 641, 661 (1994) (stating that
ajudge's asking for, or knowing acceptance of, benefits or favors that have a substantial monetary value from
a party or attorney whose case is presently being heard before the court is highly corruptive and suggests
improper use of his or her office). See generally 2 B.E. WrrxN, CALiFORNTA PROCEDURE, Courts § 26 (3d ed.
1989 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the Commission on Judicial Performance).
5. CAiL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 170.9 (e) (amended by Chapter 378); see id. (setting forth the exemptions
that relate to travel). For examples of other states' travel expense reimbursement for judges, see ALA. CODE
§ 12-1-17 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-119 (Michie 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-6-30 (1994); IND. CODE
ANN, § 33-13-3-1 (West 1983); OR. REv. STAT. § 46.632 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-6-6 (1994).
6. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 170.9(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 378); see id. (exempting wedding,
birthday, and other similar giftb exchanged between individuals that are not highly disproportionate in value);
cf. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.571(e)(2) (Michie 1995) (excluding from mandatory financial disclosure of
judges' birthday, wedding, anniversary, or other similar gifts if the donor does not have a substantial interest
in the judge's judicial role); MODEL CODE OFJJDiciAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D)(5)(d) (1990) (stating that a gift
from a friend or relative, for an occasion such as a wedding, anniversary, or birthday, is considered proper to
accept if the gift is commensurate with the relationship and the occasion).
7. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.9(g) (amended by Chapter 378); see id 170.9(h) (amended by Chapter
378) (defining "honorarium" as meaning any payment made for any speech given, an article that is published,
or attendance at any type of conference, meeting, or any other similar kind of social event); cf. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 89502(b) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "honorarium," in cases involving public officials and candidates,
to include payment received for any speech given, article written and published, or attendance at any type of
public or private event or gathering); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18931.1 (1995) (defining "speech" as a public
address, oration, or any other form of oral presentation including participation in a debate, panel, or seminar,
a speech given does not include any type of artistic performance); id. § 18931.2 (1995) (defining "article
published" as any nonfictional work not published in connection with a bona fide business that is published
in some type of periodical); id. § 18931.3 (1995) (defining the term "attendance" as being present during, or
making an appearance at, including acting as any type of host for, any public or private gathering such as
conferences, conventions, meetings, or meals); id. § 18932.3 (1995) (stating that speechmaking will be
determined to be the predominate activity of an official's business in the following situations: (1) In cases
where the official has been in business for more than one year, and during the 12 month period prior to and
including the speech, the official's business has spent more than 50% of its time preparing or giving speeches,
or during this same time period the official's business made more than 50% of its gross income on speech
preparation or presentation; or (2) if the official's business has been in existence for less than a year, the same
provisions as set forth above apply except that the time frame is 30 days instead of 12 months); id. § 18932.5
(1995) (excluding from honorarium charitable donations if the donation is made to a reputable tax-exempt
nonprofit organization and is not delivered to the official, the official does not make a speech, write an article
or make an attendance conditioned upon the donation, the official does not use the donation as a deduction for
his or her tax purposes, the donation will have no immediate and known effect financially on the official or his
or her immediate family, and the official's name is not identified with the donation; but if the official knows
or has reason to know of a donation to be made on his behalf, he or she must notify that person and inform
them that such a donation cannot be made).
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Chapter 378 redefines exceptions to the term honorarium.8
Existing law exempts certain items from the definition of the term gift as used
in conjunction with a judge.9 Chapter 378 adds to these exemptions in the
definition of the term gift.' °
COMMENT
Section 170.9 of the California Code of Civil Procedure was created in 1994
to uniformly apply the gifts and honoraria rules to public officials and judges."'
Chapter 378 was created to clarify the provisions as stated in the prior version of
California Civil Procedure Code section 170.9. 2 Prior to the statute's enactment,
the Canons in the California Code of Judicial Conduct were the only available
guidance on gift limitations. 3 However, the Canons in the California Code of
8. Compare 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1238, sec. 1, at 6342 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 170.9(i))
(stating that honorarium does not include income that is earned for personal services which are normally
provided in the connection with a practice of a bona fide profession, including teaching or writing for a legal
publisher, which is a bona fide publisher of legal publications that are used to educate lawyers or judges, and
also, does not include fees received for the performance of a marriage pursuant to California Penal Code §
94.5) with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 170.9(i) (amended by Chapter 378) (excluding writings for all publishers,
not just legal publishers); cf. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 89502(c) (West Supp. 1995) (excluding from the definition
of honorarium, in the context of honorarium given to public officials and candidates, income earned from
personal services which are ordinarily associated with a bona fide business, unless the predominant and sole
activity of the business is making speeches, and any honorarium which is not used within 30 days after receipt
and is either returned to the donor or given to the State Controller for donation to the general fund).
9. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 170.90)(2)-(6) (amended by Chapter 378); see id. (exempting gifts which
are not used and are returned within 30 days after receipt or given to a charitable organization without realizing
any tax benefit, gifts given to ajudge from closely related relatives, campaign contributions that are required
to be reported pursuant to the California Government Code, any type of inheritance or devise, and personalized
plaques and trophies that each value less than $250).
10. Id. § 170.9()(1), (7) (amended by Chapter 378); see id. § 170.9(1)(7) (amended by Chapter 378)
(exempting admission to events that are presented by state or local bar associations or judges' professional
associations as long as no type of travel is necessary as described in California Code of Civil Procedure §
170.9(e)(3)). Compare 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1238, sec. 1, at 6343 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
170.9(1)(1)) (exempting from the definition of gift, informational material consisting of books, pamphlets,
reports, calendars, or periodicals and stating that no payment for travel or reimbursement for any expense will
be considered as informational material) with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.9(l)(1) (amended by Chapter 378)
(adding to the informational material exception: (1) Discs and cassettes; and (2) gratuitous or reduced price
admission, tuition costs, or registration for conferences or seminars of the informational variety).
11. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMM1T-E ANALYSIS OF SB 353, at 2 (May 2, 1995); see CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 89501-89505 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth the gift and honorarium limitations for
state officials, local officials, and their employees); see also Telephone Interview with Mike Foulkes,
Legislative Consultant to Senator Alquist on SB 353 (July 27, 1995) (notes on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (stating that SB 353 was created to clarify the law in this area and take care of glitches with prior law
that did not make any sense); id. (noting as an example that an exception to gifts was created for judges who
attend certain events hosted by state or local bar associations, which previously did not exist and bar
associations believed was needed).
12. AssEMBLYJUDICiARYCo.MMmrEECOmmnEANALYSISoFSB 353, at 2 (June21, 1995); see 1994
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1238, sec. 1, at 6341-43 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.9) (providing the law as
it existed before the creation of Chapter 378).
13. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrnEE ANALYStS oFSB 353, at I (May 8, 1995); see CAL CODE OFJUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 4D(1)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that judges should not involve themselves in
financial situations that may be perceived to exploit their position, or become involved in continuous business
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Judicial Conduct do not have the power of laws or regulations. 4 Nonetheless,
California courts have recognized that a judge's failure to comply with these
Canons suggests performance that is below an acceptable level.'5
Matthew E. Farmer
Civil Procedure; land use and development agreements-90-day statute of
limitations
Government Code § 65009 (amended).
SB 333 (Campbell); 1995 STAT. Ch. 253
Existing law requires all cities and counties to adopt a general plant and it
relations with those who may likely come before the court); id. Canon 4D(4) (West Supp. 1995) (suggesting,
in most situations, that judges should not accept, and should urge their family members not to accept, a gift,
loan, or any type of favor from anyone); see also id. Canon 4 (West Supp. 1995) (suggesting that judges
conduct their quasi-judicial or extra-judicial activities so as to minimize any chance of conflicting interests);
cf. ARIZ. JUDICIAL ETmIcs, Canon 4 (1994) (providing a very similar canon as found in California); W. VA.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, Canon 5 (1994) (setting forth a very similar canon as found in California). See
generally Mark S. Bagula & Robert C. Coates, Trustees of the Justice System: QuasiJudicial Activity and the
Failure of the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 617, 618-20 (1994)
(introducing a background discussion of the creation of the ABA Canons of Judicial Conduct).
14. Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 49 Cal. 3d 826, 838 n.6, 728 P. 2d 239,245 n.6,
264 Cal. Rptr. 100, 106 n.6 (1989); see id. (recognizing that even though canons do not have the power of law
or regulation, they do reflect a judicial consensus regarding a standard of behavior).
15. Id; see Adams v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 8 Cal. 4th 630, 663, 882 P. 2d 358, 378-79,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 641, 661 (1994) (stating that a violation of a canon will generally be conduct that falls below
the standards expected of California's judges, even though not every violation will involve moral turpitude,
dishonesty, or corruption).
I. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. 1995) (listing the elements that must be included in
a general plan: land use, circulation, housing, conservation, open-space, noise, and safety); id. § 65303 (West
Supp. 1995) (permitting the general plan to include any other elements that relate to the physical development
of property). See generally id. §§ 65300-65307 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (regulating the authority for and
scope of general plans); i. §§ 65350-65362 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (governing the preparation, adoption,
and amendment of general plans); id. § 65400-65403 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (providing for the
administration of general plans); 8 B.E. WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALIoRNIA LAw, Constitutional Law § 829 (8th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth guidelines in adopting a general plan); 7 HARRY D. MILER & MARVIN
B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALiFORNIA REAL ESTATE, Subdivisions § 20:94 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the
adoption process of a general plan); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & M. Thomas Jacobson, Growth Control by the Ballot
Box: California's Experience, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (1991) (discussing use of the initiative to effect
growth control); Mark A. Nitikman, Instant Planning-Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 497 (1988) (addressing the conflict between principles governing planning and zoning laws with
other provisions of the state constitution, statutes, and case law guaranteeing the rights of initiative and
referendum to local voters on matters of local concern); Winnifred C. Ward, Shattered Plans: Amending a
General Plan Through the Initiative Process, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1005 (1993) (examining California
citizens' right to use their initiative power to amend a municipal general plan).
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allows these municipalities to enact zoning ordinances.
To ensure the completion of projects within a reasonable time, prior law
mandated that all legal proceedings challenging the adoption or amendment of
general or specific plans, the adoption or amendment of zoning ordinances, or the
determination of the legality of adopting or amending regulations attached to
specific plans be filed within 120 days of the decision? Chapter 253 prohibits
legal action against these local government land use decisions unless the suit is
brought within ninety days.4
Existing law permits developers and local officials to enter into development
agreements.5 However, prior law failed to specify a statute of limitations for the
2. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65300, 65850 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 65850 (West Supp. 1995)
(authorizing a legislative body of any county or city to adopt ordinances that regulate the following: (1) the use
of buildings, land, and open space; (2) signs and billboards; (3) the location, height, bulk, number of stories,
and size of buildings and structures; (4) the size and use of lots, yards, courts, and other open spaces; (5) the
percentage of a lot occupied by a building or structure; (6) the intensity of land use; (7) offstreet parking and
loading; (8) the maintenance and building of setback lines; (9) civic districts; and (10) the time, place, and
manner of operation of sexually oriented businesses). See generally 8 B.E. WrnuN, SUMMARY OF CALFoRNIA
LAW, Constitutional Law § 835 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (describing California zoning ordinances).
3. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 218, sec. 1, at 1191 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65009(c)); see CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65009(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 253) (requiring legal action challenging a land use decision to be
limited to the issues raised in a public hearing or in a written correspondence delivered to the public agency
unless (1) the issue could not have been raised with due diligence, or (2) the body conducting the hearing
prevented the issue from being raised); Park Area Neighbors v. Town of Fairfax, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1447-
48, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 336-37 (1994) (ruling that neighbors were precluded from challenging a low-income
housing development project in ajudicial court because they had failed to raise their objections during a public
hearing, even though the litigants did not have legal representation at the hearing); Freeman v. City of Beverly
Hills, 27 Cal. App. 4th 892, 897, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731,734 (1994) (holding that actions challenging ordinances
establishing conditional use permits were barred by 120-day limitation period even though plaintiff sought
monetary damages); Corona-Norco Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Corona, 17 Cal. App. 4th 985, 993, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 803, 807 (1993) (ruling that a school district was not precluded from challenging an amendment to
a zoning ordinance because the city council failed to issue a required notice in advance of the meeting
indicating that failure to raise issues would preclude judicial review); City of Coachella v. Riverside County
Airport Land Use Comm'n, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 1285,258 Cal. Rptr. 2d 795,799 (1989) (providing that
120-day statute of limitations is not applicable to an action challenging an airport commission's land use plan);
Beresford Neighborhood Ass'n v. San Mateo, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1180, 1187, 255 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 437 (1989)
(holding that adoption-not introduction-of zoning ordinance was a "decision" within meaning of 120-day
limitations period). See generally 8 B.E. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 828
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (describing the statute of limitations applicable to actions challenging certain
legislative land use decisions).
4. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 65009(c) (amended by Chapter 253).
5. Id. § 65865(a) (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 65865.2 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring development
agreements to specify the following: (1) the duration of the agreement, (2) the permitted uses of the property,
(3) the density or intensity of use, (4) the maximum height and size of proposed buildings, and (5) provisions
for reservation or dedication of land for public purposes); id. (permitting development agreements to include
the following: (1) provisions for subsequent discretionary actions that do not inhibit development, (2) terms
specifying a time that the project will be completed, and (3) terms and conditions concerning financing of
public facilities and subsequent reimbursement); id. § 64865A (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a
development agreement is enforceable by any party notwithstanding any change in any applicable general or
specific plan, zoning, subdivision, or building regulation adopted by the municipality entering the agreement,
which alters or amends the rules, regulations, or policies in force at the time of execution of the agreement);
see also Curtin, Jr. & Jacobson, supra note 1. at 1100-01 (defining development agreements as an agreement
between a property owner and a city under which the city agrees to apply to the subject property, unless
provided otherwise by agreement, the policies, rules and regulations in effect at the time the development
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filing of suits attacking such agreements. Under Chapter 253, a lawsuit
contesting a development agreement must be brought within ninety days after the
agreement is made.7
Prior law required challenges on behalf of the development of housing
projects for low income families to be commenced within two years! Under
Chapter 253, legal actions supporting the development of housing for low income
families must be initiated within one year
Existing law requires the Department of Housing and Community
Development (HCD)10 to review adopted housing elements"1 or amendments
within a general plan and to report on the adequacy of the elements within 120
days.1 2 Chapter 253 permits actions challenging the deficiencies of a housing
agreement was entered into); cf. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 46-121 through 46-132 (1985) (permitting the use of
development agreements in local land use decision-making). See generally CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 65865-
65869.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (governing development agreements); MILLER & STARR, supra note 1, §
20:142 (describing development agreements); Douglas R. Porter, The Relation of Development Agreements
to Plans and Planning, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEmEm: PRACrICE, POLICY, AND PRosPECTS 148 (Douglas R.
Porter & Lindell L. Marsh eds., 1989) (depicting the use of development agreements as an expedient alternative
to complex policy making by public officials); Curtin, Jr. & Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1100 (discussing
development agreements as a reaction to growth control measures); Eric Sigg, California's Development
Agreement Statute, 15 Sw. U. L. REV. 695 (1985) (reviewing the history and rationale of California's
development agreement statute); William Fulton, Building and Bargaining in California, CAL. LAW., Dec.
1984, at 36, 39 (indicating that local government officials use development agreements as bargaining tools to
compensate for lost revenue resulting from the passage of Proposition 13).
6. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 333, at I
(Apr. 17, 1995); see id. (expressing that the statute of limitations might be four years which is the general
statute of limitations for civil cases); Fact Sheet from the Office of Senator Tom Campbell (copy on file with
the Pacific Law Journal) (indicating that there have been no published appellate court decisions addressing
the deadline for attacking development agreements); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 343 (West 1982)
(providing that the statute of limitations for civil cases is four years).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65009(cX4) (amended by Chapter 253).
8. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 218, sec. 1, at 1191 (amending CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65009(d)); see id.
(providing that the two-year limitation period applies to actions that meet both of the following two
requirements: (1) It is brought to support the development of housing projets which meet the requirements
for housing for persons and families with low or moderate incomes set forth in California Government Code
§ 65915; and (2) it is brought with respect to actions taken pursuant to California Government Code §§ 65580-
65589.8, pursuant to California Government Code §§ 65589.5, 65863.6, 65915 or 66474.2, or pursuant to
California Government Code §§ 65913-65914); id. (providing that the cause of action accrues 60 days after
notice of deficiencies is filed or the legislative body takes a final action in response to the notice); see also CAL
GOV'T CODE § 65580-65589.8 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (regulating housing elements); id. § 65589.5 (West
Supp. 1995) (declaring legislative intent regarding low income housing); id. § 65863.6 (West 1983) (requiring
local governments to balance housing needs with public service needs and available fiscal and environmental
resources); id. § 65915 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the requirements for housing for low income persons);
id. § 66474.2 (West Supp. 1995) (governing approval or disapproval of a tentative map and the ordinance,
policies, and standards of a public agency).
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65009(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 253); see SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COMMI=TE ANALYSIS OFSB 333, at 5 (May 16, 1995) (indicating that to offset the shorter statute of limitations
the word "project" was dropped in order to allow low income people to initiate lawsuits in support of low
income housing generally, rather than with respect to particular housing projects).
10. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 50400-50514 (West 1986 & Special Pamphlet 1995) (setting
forth the organization, general powers, policy activities, and assistance activities of the HCD).
11. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65582(d) (West Supp 1995) (defining "housing element" as the housing
element of a community's general plan, as required by California Government Code § 65302).
12. Id. § 65585(h) (West Supp. 1995).
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element to be filed within sixty days after the HCD reports its findings."
COMMENT
Chapter 253 is designed to promote development by creating a shorter statute
of limitations for actions contesting certain local legislative land use decisions.
4
By ensuring the validity of these decisions, Chapter 253 encourages builders and
bankers to take risks and to invest in projects that contribute towards the
development of the community.'5 In addition, Chapter 253 is intended to provide
certainty with respect to lawsuits attacking development agreements by clarifying
the deadline by which these challenges can be initiated.'
6
Critics contend that Chapter 253 is based on the faulty assumption that the
only parties interested in contesting land use decisions by local officials are
sophisticated litigants.'7 In their view, Chapter 253 does not protect the rights of
innocent and inexperienced parties from the potential harmful effects of these
decisions.'
Interestingly, the constitutional validity of the use of development agreements
in land use decision-making has never been tested.'9 The use of such agreements
could be invalid on the grounds that it contracts the state's police power away.2"
Alternatively, development agreements may be subject to the protection of the
13. Id. § 65009(i) (amended by Chapter 253); see ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITfEE ANALYSIS OFSB 333,
at 2-3 (July 10, 1995) (asserting that the establishment of a 60-day period to challenge the adequacy of a
housing element, which commences after the HCD reports its findings, relieves housing advocates from having
to file unnecessary, premature lawsuits to protect their rights).
14. SENATE COMMEE ON HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAiRS, CoMMrrmaANAYSISOFSB 333, at 2 (Apr.
17, 1995); see iUL at 1-2 (stating that SB 333 applies to the following land use decisions: (1) general plans; (2)
specific plans; (3) zoning; (4) regulations of specific plans; (5) decisions involving affordable housing projects;
and (6) decisions adopting, amending, or modifying a development agreement).
15. SENATEJUDICiARY CoMMrrTEE. CoMMrlrEE ANALYSIs oF SB 333, at 4 (May 16, 1995).
16. AssMBaLYCOMMnrrEEONLocALGovERNMENTCo tirEANALysis o SB 333, at 2 (July 5,
1995); see id. (citing supporters as asserting that development agreements are too easily subject to frivolous
legal challenges with a four-year time frame, which discourages financial investment and secure development);
Letter from Eileen Reynolds, Legislative Advocate, California Association of Realtors, to Senator Tom
Campbell (June 20, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (declaring that SB 333 provides more
certainty to developers and pro-housing advocates as they pursue much needed housing at the local level);
Letter from Richard Lyon, Legislative Advocate, California Building Industry Association, to Senator Tom
Campbell (May 15, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (maintaining that SB 333 strikes a
balance between achieving greater certainty for public agencies and project applicants, while ensuring the right
of the public to object to land use decisions contained within development agreements in a timely manner).
17. ASSEMBLYFLOOR,COMMITTEANALYSTsOFSB 333, at2 (July 10, 1995); see Savy Compromise,
L.A. TtMcS, July 9, 1989, at 2 (Metro) (reporting that the Sierra Club and San Diegans for Managed Growth
accepted a $500,000 settlement from developers in return for dropping a lawsuit, which challenged the city's
decision to permit developers to build on 320 acres, after the environmental groups failed to file the suit within
the statute of limitations period); id. (characterizing lawsuits between environmental groups and developers
as public-interest volunteers with financial Goliaths for adversaries).
18. ASSEmLYFLOOR, CoMMrrrEEANALYsIS oFSB 333, at 2 (July 10, 1995).
19. Curtin Jr. & Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1101.
20. Id.
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contracts clause of the United States Constitution.2'
Julia A. Butcher
Civil Procedure; mobilehomes-final money judgment
Civil Code § 798.61 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure §§ 700.080,
715.010 (amended); Health and Safety Code § 18080.9 (new); § 18005.8
(amended).
SB 69 (Kelley); 1995 STAT. Ch. 446
Existing law, known as the Mobilehome Residency Law, regulates rights and
duties of residents' and managers2 of mobilehome parks. Existing law permits
a court to enter a judgment of abandonment of a mobilehome if certain
21. Sigg, supra note 5, at 712-13; see id. (arguing that the main issue concerning the enforceability of
development agreements involves the tension between the reserved powers doctrine and the contracts clause
of the United States Constitution); see also U.S. CONsT. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that no state shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts). See generally Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Sanford M. Skaggs, Legal
Issues and Considerations, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PRoSPECTS 121, 125-27
(Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L. Marsh eds., 1989) (examining whether development agreements bargain away
police power or whether they are protected by the contracts clause of the United States Constitution); William
G. Holliman, Jr., Development Agreements and Vested Rights in California, 13 URB. LAW. 44, 49-58 (1981)
(analyzing Supreme Court cases dealing with the police power of states and the contracts clause of the United
States Constitution and their significance towards the validity of development agreements); Bruce M. Kramer,
Development Agreements: To What Extent Are They Enforceable?, 10 REAL Esr. LJ. 29 (1981) (discussing
the reserved powers doctrine and the contracts clause of the United States Constitution and their applicability
to determining the legality of development agreements).
1. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 798.11 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "resident" as a homeowner or other
person who lawfully occupies a mobilehome); see also id. § 798.8 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "rental
agreement" as an agreement between the management and the homeowner establishing the terms and
conditions of a park tenancy, including a lease agreement); id. § 798.9 (West Supp. 1995) (defining
"homeowner" as a person who has a tenancy in a mobilehome park under a rental agreement); id. § 798.12
(West Supp. 1995) (defining "tenancy" as a right of a homeowner to use a site within a mobilehome park on
which to locate, maintain, and occupy a mobilehome, site improvement, and accessory structures for human
habitation, including use of services and facilities).
2. See id. § 798.2 (West 1982) (defining "management" as the owner of a mobilehome park or an
agent or representative authorized to act on his behalf regarding to matters of tenancy in the park).
3. Id. §§ 798-799.8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); see id. (setting forth the provisions of the Mobilehome
Residency Law, including the obligations of the residents and managers of mobilehome parks); see also id.
§ 798.4 (West 1982) (defining "mobilehoe park" as an area of land where two or more mobilehome sites are
rented, or held out for rent, to accommodate mobilehomes used for human habitation).
4. See id. § 798.61(a)(2XA) (amended by Chapter 446) (providing that mobilehome includes trailer
coach, or a recreational vehicle); see also CAL. H LTH & SAFErY CODE § 18010 (West Supp. 1995) (defining
"recreational vehicle" as a motor home, travel trailer, truck camper, or camping trailer, with or without motive
power, designed for human habitation for recreational, emergency, or other occupancy, or a park trailer
designed for human habitation for recreational or seasonal use only); CAL. VEH. CODE § 635 (West Supp. 1995)
(defining "trailer coach" as a vehicle, other than a motor vehicle, designed for human habitation or human
occupancy for industrial, professional, or commercial purposes, for carrying property on its own structure, and
for being drawn by a motor vehicle); cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18008 (West Supp. 1995) (defining
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conditions are established and no party demonstrates an interest in the mobile-
home. Chapter 446 allows a party to establish an interest in a mobilehome by
evidence of a right to possession or a security interest6 in the mobilehome.7
Existing law requires a specified procedure for the imposition of a levy upon
personal property. Chapter 446 permits a levy to be assessed upon a
mobilehome. 9
Existing law, known as the Mobilehomes-Manufactured Housing Act of
1980, requires annual registration with the Department of Housing and Com-
"mobilehome" as a structure transportable under permit in one or more sections, designed, and equipped to
contain not more than two dwelling units to be used with or without a foundation system, or a structure
transportable under a permit in one or more sections, designed to be used with a foundation system for a three
or more dwelling units, a dormitory, a residential hotel, or an efficiency unit).
5. CAL CIV. CODE § 798.61(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 446); see id. § 798.61(a)(1)(A)-(C) (amended
by Chapter 446) (defining an "abandoned mobilehome" as a mobilehome that is located on a mobilehome park
where no rent has been paid for the preceding 60 days, the mobilehome is unoccupied, and a reasonable person
would believe it to be unoccupied); see also Marlow v. Campbell, 7 Cal. App. 4th 921, 928, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d
516, 520 (1992) (holding that only the municipal and justice courts, not the superior court, will have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment of abandonment of a mobilehome or a manufactured home); id.at 927-28, 9
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520 (declaring that this is not solely a declaratory relief judgment, which allows a superior
court to hear a case, because there was a judgment of costs as well as an abandonment judgment, there was a
petition seeking to permit plaintiffs to inventory the mobilehome's contents, and there was a petition seeking
to sell the mobilehome); cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 210, para. 117/10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (defining
"abandoned mobile home" as not having an owner or authorized tenant currently residing in the mobile home
to the best of the knowledge of the municipality, has had no utilities payments declared overdue, and the taxes
are overdue by three months); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562B.27(l) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "abandoned mobile
home" as one in which the tenant has been absent for 30 days or more without a reasonable explanation during
which time the rent is either in default for three or more days or the rental agreement is terminated); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, §6248(a) (Supp. 1994) (declaring that a mobile home is abandoned if a reasonable person would
believe that the mobile home is not occupied, the rent is 30 days overdue, and the park owner has attempted
to contact the resident or owners at their home address, last known place of employment, and last known
mailing address). See generally 4 B.E. WrrnN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNA LAW, Real Property § 539 (9th ed.
Supp. 1995) (setting forth the definition of "abandoned mobilehome" and the process for notice, judgment, and
sale of the mobilehome); Erik Nelson, Trailer Park Neighbors Fear Loosened Regulations Abandoned Mobile
Homes Would Be Permitted to Sit Vacantfor6 Months, BdmMORE SUN, Jan. 11, 1993, at 7B (discussing how
all mobile home parks experience abandoned trailers and that this leads to teenagers using the trailers how they
want).
6. See CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(37)(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "security interest" as an interest
in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation); see also id. §
1201(37)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth when a transaction creates a security interest and the occurrences
that do not create a security interest).
7. CAL. Civ. CODE § 798.61(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 446); cf. IowA CODE ANN. § 555B.8(2) (West
Supp. 1995) (requiring only that the mobile home owner or other claimant showing an interest in the property
satisfy the judgment before taking possession); MO. ANN. STAT. § 700.533 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (requiring
an owner or holder of a valid security interest seeking possession of a manufactured home to show proof of
ownership or show a valid security interest).
8. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 700.080(a) (amended by Chapter 446); see id. (requiring the levying
officer to serve a copy of the writ of execution and a notice with one of the occupants, or a person of suitable
age in the absence of the occupants, or post the copy and notice on the property).
9. Id. § 700.080(d) (amended by Chapter 446); seeid. (including a mobilehome in the definition of
personal property).
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munity Development, unless the mobilehome or manufactured home0 satisfies
certain requirements." Existing law also requires each individual possessing a
security interest in a manufactured home subject to registration to file specified
information with the Department regarding the security interest.'
2
Chapter 446 provides that if a mobilehome park owner receives a final money
judgment for unpaid rent against a registered owner of a mobilehome or a
manufactured home registered with the Department, the mobilehome park owner
may perfect a lien 3 against that mobilehome or manufactured home conforming
with the specified provisions of the Mobilehomes-Manufactured Housing Act of
1980, by filing a form determined by the Department.14 A lien instituted under
Chapter 446 is not a security interest under the definition of "legal owner' 5 in the
act.' 6 Chapter 446 further provides that a lien instituted under Chapter 446 is not
subject to execution.' 7 Chapter 446 requires reduction of the lien amount created
under Chapter 446 by the amount the legal owner or junior lienholder t8 is
10. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18007 (West 1984) (defining "manufactured home" as a
structure, transportable in one or more sections, which is 8 feet by 40 feet in traveling mode, or is 320 square
feet when erected, and is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling, with or without
a permanent foundation, when connected to the required facilities).
11. Id § 18075.5 (b), (d)-(f) (West Supp. 1995); see id (requiring registration for manufactured homes,
mobilehomes, commercial coaches, and floating homes unless the structure remains affixed to the foundation
system, the structure is owned by a member, or former member, of the Armed Forces if displaying a valid
registration with respect to a manufactured home or mobilehome from the owner's home state, or any other
manufactured homes determined by the Department to be subject to exception); see also id. § 18075.7 (West
Supp. 1995) (exempting from registration with the Department of Housing and Community Development any
truck camper permanently attached to a vehicle and registered as a "house car").
12. Id. § 18080.7 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 18085(b) (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the
information to be contained in the registration application to include the true name and mailing address of the
registered owner, the legal owner, and any lien holders, the name of the county where the registered owner
resides, the address where the home is located, and a description of the home).
13. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 2872 (West 1993) (defining "lien" as a charge imposed in some mode other
than by a transfer in trust upon specific property by which it is made security for the performance of an act);
see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1180 (West 1982) (defining "lien"as a charge imposed upon specific
property, by which is made security for the performance of an act). See generally 4 B.E. WITKiN, SUMMARY
OFCAwIORNtA LAW, Personal Property § 168 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (defining the nature and different
kinds of liens); John K. Pearson, Kansas Artisan's & Mechanic's Liens: An Unnecessary Tangle, 63 J. KAN.
BAR ASS'N, 28, 29 (1994) (discussing the differences between a lien and a security interest).
14. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 18080.9(a) (enacted by Chapter 446); cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
376.480(l) (Baldwin 1994) (allowing any owner of real property who rents space on which a mobile home sits
to have a lien for rent due on the mobile home, its contents, and other personalty abandoned by the tenant on
the landlord's property for rent due, reasonable storage, cleanup costs, and utilities); TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-6A.18(l) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that an owner of real property may establish a possessory
lien against a manufactured home for unpaid rent). See generally John C. Siemers, The Mortgagee's Lien
Against Rents, 25 TEX. TaCt L. REv. 873 (1994) (discussing the perfection and enforcement of liens against
rents of real and personal property in various types of jurisdiction and under the Uniform Commercial Code).
15. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18005.8 (amended by Chapter 446) (defining "legal owner"
as one holding a security interest in a manufactured home, mobilehome, commercial coach, floating home, or
a truck camper perfected by filing the appropriate documents with the Department).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 18080.9(d) (enacted by Chapter 446).
18. See id. § 18005.3 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "junior lienholder" as a person, other than the legal




required to pay according to certain provisions of the Mobilehome Residency
Law.
19
Once a money judgment is satisfied, Chapter 446 requires a lien perfected
according to Chapter 446 to be released as specified.20 Under Chapter 446, the
judgment creditor would be liable for all damages, for a specified penalty of
$100, and for the opposing party's reasonable attorney's fees if the judgment
creditor fails without just cause to comply within twenty days of the date the
judgment creditor's lien is satisfied.2 ' Chapter 446 designates a mobilehome park
owner filing a lien created according to Chapter 446 as a junior lienholder for the
purposes of sale pursuant to the act regarding disposal of a repossessed or
surrendered manufactured home, mobilehome, truck camper, or floating home.'
Chapter 446 requires that the registered owner abandon any claim to
possession of, or ownership interest in, a mobilehome or manufactured home
once the legal owner accepts the registered owner's surrender of ownership
interest.Y Chapter 446 also provides that the registered owner would be divested
of title to the mobilehome or manufactured home after completion of
foreclosure.2 4 Chapter 446 further specifies the procedure for extinguishing a
judgment lien filed pursuant to Chapter 446.?
COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 446 is to protect mobile home park owners' money
judgments and to permit and to collect unlawful detainer judgments against
defaulting park tenants.2 However, the opposition contends that Chapter 446 will
19. Id. § 18080.9(e) (enacted by Chapter 446); see CAL. CirV. CODE § 798.56a(b)(1)(A), (b)(4) (West
Supp. 1995) (allowing a legal owner or junior lienholder to sell a mobilehore as long as the person satisfies
all responsibilities owed to management by the homeowner 90 days prior to notice of termination of tenancy
and the person reimburses the management the amount of reasonable attorney's fees and court costs incurred
to bring the termination of tenancy action).
20. CALHEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 18080.9(h) (enacted by Chapter 446); see id. § 18100.5(a) (West
Supp. 1995) (requiring the Department to be notified within 20 days of the extinguishment of any transfer or
release of a security interest so that there is no obligation to extend credit, incur obligations, or otherwise give
value for the manufactured home or mobilehome).
21. Id. § 18080.9(h) (enacted by Chapter 446).
22. Id. § 18080.9(a) (enacted by Chapter 446); see § 18080.9(f)(3) (enacted by Chapter 446) (extin-
guishing a judgment lien if upon the payment of any surplus proceeds owed to the junior lienholder if the
proceeds of the sale exceeds the amount due to the legal owner from the registered owner under the security
agreement, promissory note, or other debt instrument secured by the manufactured home or mobilehome).
23. Id. § 18080.9(f)(l)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 446).
24. Id. § 18080.9(g) (enacted by Chapter 446).
25. Id. § 18080.9(f)(1)-(3), (g) (enacted by Chapter 446); see id. (providing that a judgment lien will
be extinguished if the proceeds of the sale of the surrendered mobilehome or manufactured home by the legal
owner is not sufficient to satisfy the amount due to the legal owner by the registered owner, upon the payment
of any surplus proceeds owed to the junior lienholder if the proceeds of the sale by the legal owner e,:ceeds
the amount due to the legal owner, or upon the completion of foreclosure).
26. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrra ANALYsIs oF SB 69, at 3 (May 11, 1995); see SENATE JUDICIARY
Commnerr ComEEANALYsis oF SB 69, at 3 (Mar. 28, 1995) (setting forth the sponsor's argument that
the law protects a secured creditor from a secured debtor transferring title to the mobilehome, and protects a
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require lenders to bring unnecessary foreclosure actions in order to clear the
junior judgment lien of the park owner.27 The opposition also contends that
Chapter 446 hinders the lender's ability to resell a reacquired mobilehome, and
creates an inappropriate lien because Chapter 446 ignores the distinction between
real property and mobilehomes.O
According to the sponsor, the intent of Chapter 446 is to provide an
established standard for the courts to follow in an abandonment hearing brought
by a mobilehome park owner.29 Finally, Chapter 446 clarifies the power of
levying officers to levy upon a mobilehome whether or not it is occupied?
Chad D. Bernard
Civil Procedure; small claims courts
Code of Civil Procedure § 116.541 (new); § 116.220 (amended).
AB 725 (Baldwin); 1995 STAT. Ch. 366
Existing law specifies the actions in which a small claims court has
judgment creditor from a debtor transferring title if there is a lien in place); id. (quoting the Western
Mobilebome Parkowner's Association as stating that there is a loophole in the law depriving mobilehome park
owners of the same protection as a secured creditor); id. (noting the sponsor's argument that a park resident
who loses an unlawful detainer action and against whom a money judgment has been issued can remove the
mobilehome from the site and sell it without the mobilehome park management having any recourse).
27. SENATE JuDicIARY CoMMrrrnm, CoMmTrrEE ANALYsis oF SB 69, at 4 (Mar. 28, 1995); see id.
(noting the contention by the California Manufactured Housing Institute that under the law prior to the
enactment of SB 69, many borrowers surrender the property to the lender when the borrower falls behind on
the mortgage, but SB 69 requires the lender to foreclose on the property in order to clear the junior judgment
lien); id. (setting forth the opposition's contention that this unnecessary foreclosure would cause lending for
manufactured homes and mobilehomes to become more expensive).
28. Id.; see id. (explaining the opposition's argument that loans will be more expensive after the
enactment of SB 69 because a mobilehome park owner can get a money judgment after the lender has
foreclosed, and the new judgment lien would not be eliminated by the earlier foreclosure); id. (noting that a
lender can protect from a later judgment lien by registering the foreclosure action with the Department of
Housing and Community Development, but this process may take three to six months, and force the lender to
assume additional expense pending the completion of the process); see also id. (discussing the opposition's
contention that a lien on real property is due to a recognition that the lien holder has performed a service that
benefits or enhances the property, similar to a carpenter's lien); id. (contrasting a real property lien with a lien
for back rent, which does not confer a benefit on the property, and thus the lender becomes a guarantor of
payment of park rents). But see id. at 4-5 (setting forth Western Mobilehome Parkowner's Association's
argument that the opposition does not distinguish between a mechanic's lien and a judgment lien, and that a
judgment lien should be enforceable whether the lien is on real or personal property).
29. SENATE JUDiCLARY CoMMI'rmm, CommrrrE ANALYsTs oF SB 69, at 5 (Mar. 28, 1995); see id.
(stating Western Mobilehome Parkowner's Association's concern that current law allegedly allows a third party
to stop an abandonment proceeding by simply stating that they live in the mobilehome); id. (noting that SB 69
requires the third party to show evidence that they are a co-owner, tenant, co-tenant, sub-tenant, assignee, or
have some other right to possession or security interest of the mobilehome).
30. Id.; see id. (describing the sponsor's desire to have the power to levy clarified in order to prevent
another case of a judge construing the permittance of a levy only if the mobilehome was unoccupied).
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jurisdiction.' Chapter 366 expands existing law by requiring that in actions filed
by those held in a Department of Corrections or Youth Authority facility, the
small claims court maintains jurisdiction over a defendant provided the plaintiff
has specifically alleged that he or she has exhausted any administrative remedies
available against that department and has complied with specific sections of the
California Government Code.2
Existing law provides that only the individual plaintiff and defendant may
take part in a small claims action.3 Chapter 366 expands existing law by
permitting the Department of Corrections and the Department of Youth Authority
1. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.220(a) (amended by Chapter 366); see id. (setting forth the various
actions in which a small claims court will have jurisdiction as follows: (1) the recovery of money, ifthe amount
does not exceed $5000; (2) to enforce payment of delinquent unsecured personal property taxes if not more
than $5000, provided the legality of the tax is not contested; (3) to issue a writ of possession authorized by
California Civil Code §§ 1861.5 and 1861.10 if the amount of the demand is not in excess of $5000; (4) to
confirm, modify, or vacate a fee arbitration award of $5000, or less, between an attorney and client that is
binding or has become binding, or to hold a new hearing between an attorney and client after a fee dispute has
been subject to nonbinding arbitration with a result not in excess of $5000); see also id. § 116.220(b) (amended
by Chapter 366) (establishing that in any action seeking assistance under the California Code of Civil
Procedure § 116.220(a), the court may grant relief by way of rescission, restitution, reformation, and specific
performance, instead of, or in addition to, damages); id. (providing that the court may issue a conditional
judgment and will retain jurisdiction until full payment and performance of any judgment or order); Id. §
116.220(c) (amended by Chapter 366) (providing that notwithstanding the California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 116.220(a), the small claims court will have jurisdiction over a defendant guarantor who is obligated to
appear due to another's default, actions, or omissions, only if the demand is not more than $2500); Id. §
116.220(d) (amended by Chapter 366) (providing that when jurisdiction is deprived due to an excess in the
demand amount, that excess may be waived--becoming operative upon judgment); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.2615(2X2) (West 1993) (providing that a small claims court may have jurisdiction over a claim if it does
not exceed $5000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-35-502(1) (1995) (stating that a small claims court has jurisdiction
when the amount of the claim does not exceed $3000 exclusive of costs); NEa. REV. STAT. § 25-2802(1) (1989)
(stating that jurisdiction is available to claims not exceeding $1500 dollars, irrespective of interest and costs);
NE. REv. STAT. ANN. § 73.010 (1986) (providing that a small claims court shall have jurisdiction when the
amount claimed does not exceed $1500 dollars and the defendant is a resident of the township in which the
action is to take place); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 28.003(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the small
claims court has jurisdiction for recovery of money not in excess of $5000 exclusive of costs). See generally
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 116.110-116.950 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the Small Claims Act).
2. CAL Cv. PRoc. CoDE § 116.220(e) (amended by Chapter 366); see id. (specifying that the plaintiff
must comply with California Government Code §§ 905.2 and 905.4); see also id. § 116.220(e) (amended by
Chapter 366) (providing that in lieu of that allegation, the final administrative adjudication or determination
by the department of the plaintiff's claim may be attached to the complaint at the time of filing); id. §
116.220(0 (amended by Chapter 366) (establishing that in any action governed by California Code of Civil
Procedure § 116.220(e), if the plaintiff fails to show proof of compliance with the specified requirements at
the time of trial, the judicial officer may either dismiss the action or continue it until the plaintiff has had an
opportunity to provide such proof); id. § 116.220(g) (amended by Chapter 366) (defining "department" as
including an employee of a department against whom a claim has been filed arising out of his duties as an
employee of that department); CAL GOV'T. CODE § 905.2 (West 1995) (establishing a definitional scheme for
all claims for money or damages against the state); id. § 905.4 (West 1995) (providing that California
Government Code §§ 900-915.4 are not to be construed as an exclusive means for presenting claims to the
Legislature nor as preventing the Legislature from making such appropriations for the payment of claims
against the state which have not been submitted to the board or recommended for payment by it).
3. M § 116-540(a) (West Supp. 1995); see ASSEmBLY JUDICIARY COMMnTEE, COMMrrIEEANALYSIS
OFAB 725, at 3-4 (May 3, 1995) (suggesting that small claims courts were established on the principle of self-
representation in order to provide an informal judicial forum for persons of limited resources to resolve a small
claim face to face).
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to participate in a small claims proceeding through a regular employee, who is
employed for reasons other than representing the department.4
Chapter 366 additionally provides that where the Department of Corrections
or the Department of the Youth Authority is a defendant in small claims court, the
department's representative is not required to personally appear to challenge
compliance with the pleading requirements by the plaintiff and may instead
submit the challenge by way of pleadings or declarations5
Furthermore, Chapter 366 establishes that at the small claims hearing, the
court shall require any individual appearing as a representative of the Department
of Corrections or the Department of the Youth Authority under California Code
of Civil Procedure section 116.541(a) to file a declaration.6
COMMENT
Small claims courts were established to offer a means of obtaining a speedy
settlement.7 However, the Department of Corrections believes that some inmates
4. CAL. CwV. PROC. CODE § 116.541(a) (enacted by Chapter 366). See generally ASSEMBLY
COMm1mTIEEON APPROPRIATIONS,COMMrI'TEEANALYSISOFAB 725, at 4 (May 3, 1995) (noting that previous
efforts to expand the use of representatives in small claims court have encountered opposition); id. (noting how
in 1993, AB 725 was "introduced to authorize public agencies to appear and participate in small claims court
actions through an unpaid volunteer representative," but this bill was vetoed by Governor Wilson because he
felt the bill was "inconsistent with the principle of self-representation upon which the small claims court system
was founded").
5. CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 116.541(b) (enacted by Chapter 366).
6. Id. § 116.541(c) (enacted by Chapter 366); see id. (providing that the declaration must state that the
individual is authorized to appear, must specify the basis for the authorization, and must verify that the
appearing person is not employed for the sole purpose of small claims court representation); id. § 116.541(d)
(enacted by Chapter 366) (noting that California Code of Civil Procedure § 116.541 shall not operate so as to
authorize an attorney to participate in a small claims action except as expressly provided in California Code
of Civil Procedure § 116.530); id. § 116.541(e) (enacted by Chapter 366) (providing that all references to the
Department of Corrections or the Department of the Youth Authority include employees against whom claims
have been filed under this chapter arising out of the employee's duties with that department); see also id. §
116.530(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that an attorney may not take part in the conduct or defense of
a small claims action unless the attorney is appearing to maintain or defend specified actions); id. § 116.530(c)
(West Supp. 1995) (noting that an attorney is not prevented from providing advice to a party to a small claims
action, testifying to facts of which he or she has personal knowledge, representing a party in an appeal to the
superior court, and representing a party in connection with the enforcement of a judgment).
7. See Martz v. MacMurray College, 627 N.E.2d 1133, 1135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that small
claims court procedures were adopted in order for one to be able to obtain justice at an affordable cost, and in
order to free up court calendars); id. at 1134-35 (expressing how unnecessary hearings and filings regarding
motions for continuance, to strike jury demand, and for dismissal allowed this case to represent an example
of the worst kind of abuse in small claims courts); see also Sanderson v. Neimann, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 573, 110
P.2d 1025, 1030 (1941) (specifying that the chief characteristics of a small claims court proceeding are that
there are "no attorneys, no pleadings, no legal rules of evidence, no juries, and no formal findings made on the
issues presented"); it (suggesting that the theory behind the court's organization is that only by escaping from
the complexity and delay of the normal course of litigation could anything be gained in a legal proceeding
which involves a small sum); Suzanne E. Elwell with Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court:
An EmpricialAnalysis, 75 IOwA L. REv. 433, 434 (1990) (discussing how small claims courts were established
to satisfy the needs of citizens who, due to the difficulties of litigating in the regular courts, were unable to
resolve disputes through the justice system); Jasper Greigson, How to Complain, DAILY MAIL, Nov. 12, 1994,
at 33 (expressing how the small claims court is easy to use, there is no need to understand the law, and you can
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of state facilities were abusing the small claims system.8
Curiously, small claims courts have often faced criticism for acting as a
collection agency as opposed to providing a means of redress for individuals.9 In
the past, the principle of self-representation underlying the small claims court
system has been used as a justification for denying collection agencies and other
assignees broad access to the small claims process. t
Although efforts to expand the use of representatives in small claims court
have not been successful in the past, the Department of Corrections believes it
necessary to permit state entity defendants to be represented in small claims court
actions."
By allowing the use of declarations to challenge jurisdictional requirements,
Chapter 366 is creating a more efficient means of using the small claims court.' 2
However, the provision requiring proof of exhausting all administrative remedies
prior to filing an action may contribute to the already overworked courthouse
represent yourself); Stephanie Mann & M.C. Blakeman, Keep Your Home Safe, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 16,
1994, at II (discussing how neighbors can file lawsuits in small claims court to shut down crack houses).
8. ASSEmBLYJUDiCIARY CommrrEE, CommrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 2 (May 3, 1995); see Id.
(noting how inmates are abusing the system with frivolous small claims actions before exhausting their
administrative remedies); id. (suggesting that inmates were abusing the system by forcing the California
Department of Corrections staff members to appear in actions by naming individual defendants); see also
Emplo)yment Law-Conditions ofEmployment, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 17,1994, at I (providing an example
of abuse in small claims courts when unnecessary hearings and filing turned a small claims case into "a near
federal monstrosity").
9. Elwell, supra note 7, at 444; see id. (recognizing that the characterization of small claims courts
as collection agencies poses the following problems: (1) The courts are not being used by those for whom they
were intended; (2) heavy use by businesses crowds the docket; and (3) excessive use by businesses discourage,
individuals from pursuing claims because of the perception that the court is a "business court"); see also Arthur
Best, Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 343, 346
(1994) (noting that of the cases filed in Denver's county courts, 70% were filed by collection agencies, and
25% of the filings came from landlords).
10. ASSEmBLY JuDICiARY CO~sMrrEE, COMMI-rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 4 (May 3, 1995); see
Newsome v. Potter, 491 N.Y.S.2d 257,259 (1985) (discussing how small claims courts have been transformed
into collection agencies by businessmen and only by prohibiting corporate and assignee plaintiffs and by
refusing to establish small claims attachment and garnishment powers is it possible to lessen the appeal for
businessmen to bring actions in small claim courts); see also County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 312 N.W.2d 731,
743 n.5 (Wis. 1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (mentioning that the small claims courts in Wisconsin arc
dominated by businesses and collection agencies, and have not been successful in providing speedy,
inexpensive results for minor disputes).
11. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMTrrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 4 (May 3, 1995); see
SENATE JUDICiARY COMMrE, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 4 (June 27, 1995) (noting that the
Department of Corrections position that permitting employees to be represented in small claims court actions
by a department representative is both necessary and cost-efficient); see also id. (specifying that while an
inmate is not required to appear, and may have a representative appear on his or her behalf, the state employees
were previously required to represent and defend themselves).
12. SENATE JUDICIARY CO/m rTEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 5 (July 11, 1995); see Id.
(noting that the provision allowing a representative to challenge a plaintiff's failure to comply with filing
requirements without requiring a personal appearance serves a similar function as a motion to strike or a
demurrer).
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clerical staffs. 13 According to the California Department of Corrections, in about
fifty percent of small claims actions the plaintiff inmate fails to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies in which it is named as a defendant. 4
By allowing claims to be dismissed for failing to show compliance in
exhausting all administrative remedies, Chapter 366 contradicts a policy of the
law that dismissal of claims for technical pleading defects is generally
disfavored.' 5
Chapter 366 was enacted in order to address these concerns and to encourage
proper use of small claims courts. 6
Laura J. Roopenian
13. ASSEMBLYJUDICIARYCOMmrEE, COMMITEE ANALYSISOFAB 725, at 6 (June 27, 1995); see id.
(noting that Judge Fredricks of the Los Angeles County South Bay Municipal Court believes that the provision
is not needed because, "'there are already existing provisions of law that prevent illegal judgments against
public entities in small claims court.' Further, 'there is no risk whatever of a public entity having a judgment
against it in small claims because of lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If a small claims judge
erred in this regard, the entity could appeal"'); see also id. (relating the statements of Judge Fredricks, who
noted that pre-suit paperwork is not required of plaintiffs in higher courts and questioned why such a
requirement should be placed on small claims litigants, when the purpose of the small claims process is to
expedite the action for both the plaintiff and defendant).
14. SENATEJUDICIARY COMMrl ,COMM1TrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 725, at5 (July 11, 1995); see SENATE
FLOOR, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 3 (July 20, 1995) (quoting the California Department of
Corrections in its assessment that requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies before filing in small
claims court will relieve the Department, staff, and the courts of the burden of large numbers of meritless
claims); id. (adding that prior to AB 725, the California Department of Corrections believed that a personal
appearance by a named defendant was required to point out to the court that the inmate had not satisfied these
preliminary requirements).
15. SENATE JuDIcIARY CoMMrrr, CoTmmTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 6 (July 11, 1995); see
Millinger v. Town of West Springfield. 515 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Mass. 1987) (noting that in the absence of unfair
surprise or prejudice there is reluctance to dismiss an action because of a possible technical defect in the
pleading).
16. ASSEMBLY JuDICIARY COMMFiTEE, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 3 (May 3, 1995); see
SENATE JuDIcIARY COMMITTEE, CoMMnarm ANALYSIS OF AB 725, at 4 (June 27, 1995) (stating that the
purpose of AB 725 is to ease the burden of the Department of Corrections and its employees in having to
defend small claims court actions brought against them by a prison inmate); see also id. at 5 (describing how
small claims judges usually dismissed frivolous claims filed by inmates, yet inmates continued to file such
actions for purposes of harassment); id. (noting that although all plaintiffs are required to exhaust their
administrative remedies before initiating judicial actions against the state, in about fifty percent of small claims
actions in which the California Department of Corrections has been named as a defendant, the inmate has failed
to exhaust all administrative remedies); ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra, at 2 (noting that 439,493
small claims court cases were filed between 1993 and 1994); id (elaborating further that during the same time
period, the Board of Control received 11,655 claims for money or damages, of which 959 were for an amount
not in excess of $5000; 626 of these claims were rejected, and while only 233 were allowed).
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